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Abstract
Consider an exchange economy with multiple competitive equilibria. Agents
know the set of equilibria, but not which will be selected. To insure against
unfavorable equilibrium outcomes, they trade on markets for commodities con-
tingent on the equilibrium price vector. Such price-contingent contracts allow
agents to insure fully against the risk stemming from uncertainty about the
equilibrium to be chosen. However they introduce further uncertainty because
there may be several possible equilibrium prices for price-index-contingent com-
modities. The introduction of higher-order derivative products removes this
uncertainty, but in turn introduces uncertainty about the prices of these prod-
ucts. We prove that in regular economies this process converges in a finite
number of steps to a unique fully-insured Pareto efficient allocation. The in-
troduction of price-contingent commodities or securities and further derivative
securities removes all endogenous uncertainty associated with lack of knowl-
edge of equilibrium prices. We thus provide a mechanism for resolving non-
uniqueness in economies with multiple equilibria and also give an important
resource-allocation role to derivative securities based on price indices.
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1 Introduction
Uncertainty about states of nature drives classical theories of resource-allocation un-
der uncertainty. Examples of uncertain states of nature are the weather, and the
occurrence of earthquakes or epidemics1. However, the dominant uncertainties facing
economic agents are clearly not about such exogenous states: they are about endoge-
nous variables such as interest rates, exchange rates, securities prices, demand levels
and employment levels. Certainly most corporate activity in risk markets broadly
defined is to hedge against uncertainty about endogenous variables. Kurz [14] has
called this endogenous uncertainty, and defined a research agenda and a framework
for analysis that has many points in common with this paper. Kurz's work on rational
beliefs [15] develops this agenda in a rather different direction from this paper.
Svensson [19] introduced some of these ideas into a temporary general equilibrium
model. Chichilnisky and Wu [9] formalize endogenous uncertainty within a general
equilibrium model with individual and collective risk. They show that this type of
uncertainty is crucially dependent on the information structure and can be generated
by financial innovation. Hahn [12] has addressed issues related to the present paper
in an incomplete market model: his concern is to exhibit the logical inconsistency of
rational expectations in a sequence economy where there are multiple equilibria in
the second period. Chichilnisky Hahn and Heal [6] develop similar issues in a more
general framework.
In view of the practical importance of endogenous uncertainty, we will not have
a satisfactory theory of resource allocation under uncertainty until general equilib-
rium theory and welfare economics are extended to cover this case. Here our aim
is to develop a formal model of institutions through which endogenous uncertainty
can be resolved in a general equilibrium framework as close as possible to the usual
Arrow-Debreu model. A natural extension of the Arrow-Debreu approach is to de-
fine commodities contingent on prices (instead of on exogenous states of nature) and
allow agents to trade these. This is precisely the approach that we take: we explore
the consequences of trading price-contingent commodities, show that this may indeed
1Note that anthropogenic influences on climate, such as carbon dioxide emission and the release
of CFCs, suggest that uncertainty about the weather is not truely exogenous.
provide an efficient form of insurance against endogenous risk, and show that trading
price-contingent commodities is equivalent to trading index options.
Consider a competitive exchange economy with multiple competitive equilibria.
This is an Arrow-Debreu economy except for the structure of information. Agents
know the set of market clearing prices, but do not know which will be selected. They
thus face a very pristine form of endogenous uncertainty, namely uncertainty about
the equilibrium price vector in. a competitive model. This uncertainty has a welfare
cost to the agents, who are assumed to be risk-averse. The welfare cost is the risk
of lower levels of welfare at unfavorable equilibrium prices. To reduce this cost,
agents are allowed to trade on markets for commodities that are contingent on the
equilibrium price vector, or contingent on an index number derived from this price
vector. The introduction of such price-contingent contracts allows agents to insure
fully against the risk stemming from uncertainty about the equilibrium to be chosen.
However further uncertainty arises if there are now several possible equilibrium prices
in the market for price-contingent commodities.
To clarify these issues, consider the market for stock index futures. There may be
several possible market clearing levels for this index number. This introduces price
uncertainty for agents trading in this market. Such uncertainty can be removed by
allowing agents to trade securities that payoff according to the index number (call
these level 1 securities). However, the market for these level 1 securities may itself have
multiple equilibria. So one source of uncertainty is removed only to be replaced by
another. Now, this second round of uncertainty can in turn be removed by introducing
higher-order or derivative securities, i.e., securities that pay off according to the value
of the level 1 securities: these we call level 2 securities. Again, this introduction of
new securities allows agents to remove one source of uncertainty only to introduce
another. In general, the introduction of securities both removes one type of uncertainty
and also introduces another type.
We show that in regular economies this process of introducing successive levels of
derivative securities will remove all endogenous uncertainty in a finite number of steps
and lead to a unique fully-insured and risk-free Pareto efficient allocation. Hence the
introduction of price-contingent commodities (or equivalently securities), and further
derivative securities, will remove all endogenous uncertainty associated with lack of
knowledge of the equilibrium prices to be selected. We thus provide a mechanism
for resolving non-uniqueness in economies with multiple equilibria, and also give an
important resource-allocation role to derivative securities. We show that the payoff
functions of the derivative securities that we introduce, can be replicated as the limit
of payoff patterns emerging from trading combinations of options. In fact they are the
payoff patterns of what Rubinstein [18] terms exotic options. Henrotte [13] has also
considered the use of options as a method of reducing endogenous price uncertainty.
With several possible equilibria and agents' welfares depending on which is se-
lected, there is an incompleteness in the market structure, in the sense of existence
of uninsured risks, even though all of the normal Arrow-Debreu markets are present.
The introduction of markets for price-contingent goods (or securities) can resolve this
and complete the market.
A fundamental constraint which distinguishes this situation from an Arrow-Debreu
market is, however, that an auctioneer cannot clear simultaneously all markets.
Goods, and securities or commodities contingent on the prices of those goods, cannot
all be traded in the same market2. Arbitrage between the goods, and the securities
whose payoffs are contingent on the prices of those goods, will restrict the set of pos-
sible securities prices in a way that ensures that the market remains incomplete (see
example 1 below). In general one cannot trade in the same market both goods and
also securities whose payoffs depend on the prices of those goods. For example, the
Treasury could not simultaneously and in the same market auction Treasury bills and
options on the prices of these Treasury bills at that date. In real markets a derivative
security whose value depends on the price of an asset is always traded prior to the
date at which the trading occurs to determine the price of the asset. However, in
an Arrow-Debreu framework, there is only one date at which trading occurs. This
makes it difficult to replicate the pattern of market access that one encounters in
real markets for assets and associated derivatives. It is therefore necessary to work
with a structure of budget constraints within the Arrow-Debreu model that replicates
this pattern of market access. This is done by defining a set of assets contingent on
the prices of other assets, some assets being logically prior to others. This structure,
denned in detail in section 2, ensures that the set of possible equilibria in markets for
logically prior assets is know (although the precise equilibrium to be selected is not)
before derivatives based on these can be traded.
Example 1. Consider an economy with 2 goods, goods price vectors p £ R2, and
several possible equilibrium price vectors. Let s(p) be a security that pays $1 iff
the equilibrium price vector is p, and q9^ be the price of this security. Suppose
that goods and all possible securities are simultaneously traded in the same
market, so that overall a price vector for this market is jp G R2, (<7s(p))Vp|.
Now if p = (1,1), we must have ga(p) = 0 V p ^ (1,1) and <fc(i,i) = 1. Otherwise
there would be infinite arbitrage opportunities.
This example illustrates the fact that the prices of securities are linearly dependent
on those of goods when all are traded in the same market, so that no extra insurance
possibilities are afforded by the introduction of securities. This issue is pursued at
greater length in Chichilnisky Hahn and Heal [6].
2 A Framework for Endogenous Uncertainty
Consider an economy with i agents indexed by i G / = {1,.., /} and J goods indexed
by j G J = {1,.., J } . Wij is agent i's endowment of good j and it;,- is agent i's
2We owe this observation to Olivier Compte.
endowment vector in RJ. Preferences are represented by utility functions £/, : RJ —•
R, and consumption vectors are ct € RJ. We make the following assumptions:
Al. Vz, U{ is strictly concave, C2 (twice continuously differentiate), monotonically
increasing and has non-zero gradients.
A2. If {TT*, C*} IS a lottery over consumption vectors c1- for agent i with probabilities
irk then i 's utility from this lottery is Sjfe
The exchange economy defined thus far will be denoted E1 and referred to as the
underlying economy: in E1 endowment are W{j, preferences are /7t, and the commodity
space is RJ. CE(E1) will denote the set of competitive equilibria of E1, with p\ being
the price vector at the A;-th equilibrium and c]k being agent z's consumption at the
fc-th equilibrium.
A3. El is regular2, so that the cardinality of CE(E1), #*, is finite.
Agents know CE(El), that is, they know the set of possible equilibria of the
underlying economy. They also know that one of the equilibria of E1 will be chosen
randomly according to a commonly-known exogenous probability distribution TT1 =
TT£, k — l , . . . ,^1 . They are allowed to hedge against the risks associated with the
random selection of an equilibrium by trading goods contingent on the equilibrium
selected in E1. The market for these contingent goods will typically have in its turn
multiple equilibria, and commodities contingent on the prices of these contingent
goods will be needed to remove uncertainty thus introduced. In order to define this
construction concisely, we introduce the concept of a multi-level economy E, in which
the underlying economy E1 forms the first level. Y denotes the set of levels in E,
with y € Y denoting a typical level. Levels are defined inductively as follows:
1. Level 1 is the underlying exchange economy El.
2. Level 2, denoted E2, is a set of markets on which agents trade goods contingent
on which element of CE(E1) is chosen according to the exogenous probabilities
TT1 = TTJ, k = 1,..., #*. The number of states in E2 is #*, the number of equilibria
in E1. Endowments in E2 are consumption vectors at the equilibria of El, so that
c}k is agent z's endowment at the k-th. state of level 2, i.e., w2k = c}k € RJ. The
overall endowment vector of agent i is w2 = \c}kj k = 1,..., # x € R3*1. Agent
z's preferences are ^k^Wiic2^). CE(E2) is the set of competitive equilibria of
JE?2, which has cardinality # 2 , with a typical price vector being p\ € RJ* , and
a typical consumption vector for agent i in state k being cfk with c2 = (c2fk)
k = 1,..., # x £ RJ# being the overall consumption vector of agent i across all
states.
3For a definition of regularity and proof that the number of equilibria in regular economies is
generically finite, see Debreu [11]. In a regular economy, the number of equilibria is locally constant
with respect to the initial endowments.
3. Level y, denoted £ly, is a set of markets on which agents trade goods contingent on
which element of CE(Ey~l) is chosen according to the exogenous probabilities
71-y-1 = xyk~\ k = 1,..., # y" 1 . The number of states in Ey is #y~\ the number of
equilibria in Ey~1. Endowments in Ey are consumption vectors at the equilibria





. The overall endowment vector of agent i is t^ f = Kf,*1) & =
I , . . . ,* 1 € # / # y ~ \ Agent z's preferences are Zk^i'1^^). CE{Ey) is the
set of competitive equilibria of Ey, which has cardinality # y , with a typical
price vector being pyk € RJ*y~ , and a typical consumption vector for agent i
in state k being cyk with cy — (cyk) , k = 1,..., #* £ i?*7**"1, being the overall
consumption vector of agent i across all states.
4. At every level y, agents know the set CE(Ey) of competitive equilibria of
that level, with cardinality # y . They also know that one of these will be
selected according to a commonly-known exogenous probability distribution
This multi-level economy provides a framework for analyzing endogenous uncer-
tainty (see also Chichilnisky Hahn and Heal [6]). A realization s is the selection of
an equilibrium at every level y £ Y. It can be described by a list of # ( F ) integers
drawn from a set S of FIy=i $ y possible such lists. #(Y) is the cardinality of Y: #y is
as before the number of states at level y, i.e., the number of equilibria at level y — 1.
A realization at level y is the selection of an equilibrium at every level less than y,
and is a list of y integers drawn a set of n*=i $* s u c n lists. A realization at level y
induces realizations at all levels less than y. In our model, level 2 realizations will be
the equilibria of the underlying exchange economy JE"1, level 3 realizations are pairs of
equilibria, one from E1 and one from E2 , the markets for goods contingent on equi-
libria in E1. Level 4 realizations are lists of three equilibria, level 2 realizations plus a
level 3 equilibrium, which is an equilibrium in a market for goods contingent on the
prices at level 2, i.e. contingent on the prices of goods that are themselves contingent
on the prices of goods in the underlying economy. Each level of the economy corre-
sponds to a different class of derivative security, i.e. to a different class of securities
whose payoffs depend on the values of other securities. These derivative securities are
introduced in an order of logical priority, so that the payoff of each depends on the
values of the prior ones.
There is another important aspect of the order in which derivative securities are
introduced. This is that the extent of price uncertainty must first be clarified before
agents can decide how to insure against it. So agents must know the set of equilibria in
the underlying economy before they can decide how much insurance is appropriate.
Likewise, they must know the extent of the uncertainty in the market for level 2
securities, i.e., the set of possible equilibria in this market, before they can choose the
appropriate amounts of insurance. So before positions can be taken in any market, it
is necessary that the extent of the risks in logically prior markets be established, i.e.,
in our framework, that the set of equilibria in these markets be established, as it is
this set which determines the risk faced by agents. It is of course also necessary that
the uncertainty in these markets should not be resolved, i.e., a particular price chosen,
until after agents have chosen quantities of insurance. These requirements determine
the inductive structure of the levels of the economy denned above. In this structure,
the set of equilibria for one level, which determines the extent of the uncertainty at
that level, has to be established before agents take positions in securities at the next
level that insure against this uncertainty. A set of equilibria, one per level, also known
as a realization, is chosen (for example by the auctioneer) after positions have been
taken by agents in all insurance markets.
It is worth emphasizing that when in E1 the auctioneer ask agents for their net
trades at various price vectors, agents do not of course know whether equilibrium in
this economy is unique or multiple. Nor does the auctioneer. This information is only
available after the excess demand function of E1 has been investigated. Hence the
only response an agent can reasonably give to a price vector quoted by the auctioneer,
is the usual utility-maximizing net trade vector. This is true for the first level E1 and
for all other levels: when responding to prices in level y, agents do not know whether
there will be further levels or what these will be.
In this framework, it is natural that the endowments at each level should be the
equilibrium consumptions of the previous level. These consumptions are the positions
that agents need to insure. Any other specification of endowments for the next level
would in effect be allowing agents to change their positions in securities traded in a
level after trading at that level has been completed. To be more specific, the contracts
traded at level 2 are goods contingent on the equilibrium price vector selected at level
1. Agents are trading, inter alia, "goods if the price vector is pi". An agent's
endowments in the original economy do not entitle her or him to any amount of
"goods if the price vector is pi". However, the contracts entered into in the economy
E1 do entitle an agent to goods at each price vector in the amounts of the equilibrium
consumption vectors at that equilibrium. Hence the agents' endowments of "goods if
the price vector is pi" are naturally the equilibrium consumptions at these prices.
Within the multi-level economy £ , a realization sy at level y specifies a price vector
for commodities and one for each level of derivative securities up to level y: it also
specifies for each agent a consumption level for commodities and consumption levels
for, or positions in, all types of contingent commodities up to level y. Equilibrium k
at level y then determines a realization-dependent consumption vector for each agent
i at level y, which we shall denote by c*yk. The overall consumption of agent i in
realization s is the sum of the consumption vectors of agent i at every equilibrium
selected in this realization. It is thus a consumption vector corresponding to the
equilibrium selected in E1, plus a consumption vector chosen in E2 contingent on
the equilibrium of E1, plus a consumption vector chosen in E3 contingent on the
equilibrium in E2, etc. Posterior levels of price-contingent contracts entitle agents to
delivery of goods vectors modifying their prior positions, and the overall consumption
vector is the sum of all of these. Formally, define C{(s) as agent z's overall consumption
in realization s. Then
<*(»,.)
y=i
where cy^y3^ is agent i's consumption in equilibrium k(y,s) of level y and k(y,s) is
the state chosen at level y in realization s.
3 Preliminary Results
An important preliminary step in our argument is establishing that all equilibria at
any level of the multi-level economy E are fully insured, i.e., they give consumption
vectors which are independent of the equilibria selected in all previous levels.
Definition: We say that E achieves full insurance and its equilibria at any level
are fully insured if for any level y, and for any equilibrium k selected at level
y, agent i's consumption vector at level y in equilibrium k in state sy, c,5 ,^ is
independent of the state sy, i.e., of which equilibria are selected in all levels prior
to y. Equivalently, consumption in equilibrium k at level y is independent of the
realization by which the chosen equilibrium at level y is reached.
Lemma 1 Under assumptions (Al) to (A3) all equilibria at all levels of E are fully
insured.
Proof. The strategy of the proof is as follows. We show that by strict concavity of
utility functions and the fact that the total endowment of the economy is realization-
independent, any realization-dependent allocation is dominated by one consisting
of its expected values. Hence any Pareto efficient allocation must give realization-
independent consumption vectors.
Let pyk be the equilibrium price vector of the k-th. equilibrium of the y-th level,
c\k be the associated consumption vector of agent i, and cy*k be the consumption
vector of agent i at the k-th. equilibrium of level y in the s-th realization at that
level. Note that for any realization s, £ , cy*k = J2i wi ^ * n e total endowment of the
economy is the same at all realizations and all levels. Define Ecyk = Y^ys ^y.Cgt ^
the expected consumption of agent i at level y in equilibrium k where the expectation
is taken over realizations ys. By strict concavity of utility functions (Al), we have
Ui(Ecyik) > 52v,WyaUi(d(*ig) provided that the equilibrium consumption vector is not
fully insured. It is feasible for agent i to consume Ecyk in each realization, since
^2iEcyik = J2t,Hy3 Kys^i'k = ^2iwi- Hence Ecyk forms a feasible allocation that is
Pareto superior to cfsk, proving that the equilibrium must be fully insured. •
Lemma 1 establishes that at any equilibrium in level y, all endogenous uncertainty
arising from uncertainty about the selection of equilibria in prior levels is removed.
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So if this level had a "unique equilibrium, agents would be fully insured against en-
dogenous uncertainty. However, this level will in general have multiple equilibria. In
Theorem 1 we show that in fact there is a finite number N such that the equilibrium at
level N will be unique and thus full insurance against endogenous uncertainty will in
fact be established. Analogous results about fully insured equilibria were established
in Malinvaud [16] [17] and in Cass and Shell [4].
We shall use the concepts of utility possibility set and utility possibility frontier
for the economy E1. The utility possibility set (UPS) is a subset of R1 consisting
of utility vectors {{7i(ci), 6^2(02), --UI(CI)} corresponding to feasible allocations in
E1, i.e., allocations {c1?..., c/} satisfying £}, c, < ]T, W{. The utility possibility frontier
(UPF) is the efficient frontier of the utility possibility set. We assume that the UPS is
a compact set in R1. Closedness is automatic: boundedness requires extra conditions.
For boundedness it would suffice if consumption sets were bounded below, or in
the case that they are unbounded, that preferences satisfy for example the limited
arbitrage condition of Chichilnisky [5] or condition (C) of Chichilnisky and Heal [7].
Lemma 2 establishes that if we add an infinite sequence of levels to the economy
E1 then in the limit the resulting equilibrium consumption allocations are Pareto
efficient, and the associated utility vector is in the UPF. In Theorem 1 we tighten
this result to show that in regular economies it in fact holds after the addition of
only a finite number of levels. Recall that cyk € RJ*y~ is agent Vs consumption at
the k-th. equilibrium of the y-th level: J2ys ^vs^i0^) ls ^n e expected utility of this
vector, where the expectation is taken over all equilibria at level y. We abbreviate it
to EUi[y] : the vector of expected utility levels for all agents is then EU[y).
Lemma 2 The vector of agents' expected utilities of consumption across equilibria
of the y-th level converges to the UPF as the number of levels becomes infinite, i.e.,
EU[y] -+ UPF as y —• 00. Furthermore, the sequence of expected utility vectors
EU[y]y=i,2,.~ l'5 Pareto improving, i.e., EU[y + 1] > EU[y] (where > denotes greater
than or equal to in all coordinates and greater in some).
Proof. U{ (cy'kj denotes agent Vs utility from the k-th equilibrium in the re-
alization ya: *£,ysKyaUi (cy'k) is the expected utility from this equilibrium over all
realizations. By Lemma 1, cy'k is realization-independent. So we let cyik stand for the
consumption of agent i at equilibrium k of level y, without specifying the realization.
Define the following subsets of the UPS:
P = UPS C R1 : Vi, Xi > min U{ (cyik) \
Iy is the set of utility vectors that give each agent a utility level at least as great as
that which the agent obtains at the equilibrium which is worst for that agent at level
y. We define By similarly, except that the minimum utility level across equilibria is
replaced by the expected utility level across equilibria. iry is as usual the probability
of equilibrium k being selected at level y.
By = ix € UPS C R1 : Vi,Xi > £>£*/,• (c?fc) 1
This is the set of utility vectors in the UPS that give each agent at least the expected
utility associated with level y. By construction of the levels, Ylkwk^i (stk) ecluals
the expected utility of the endowment vectors of agent i at level y 4- 1. Clearly we
have By C Iy unless minimum and expected utility levels are equal. In this case all
equilibria give the same utility values and we have a unique equilibrium. By Lemma
1 this is fully insured. As each equilibrium is Pareto efficient by normal arguments
this gives a utility vector in the UPF and we are done. From now on we assume
that there are multiple equilibria at each level. As the equilibria of level y -f 1 are
weakly Pareto superior to the endowments of this level, 7y+1 C By. Hence we have
the sequence:
I1 D Bl DI2 D B2DI3D B3...Iy D By..
The subsequence {Iy},y = 1,2,... defines a strictly nested sequence of subsets of the
UPS, which is itself a compact set bounded above by the UPF. In each dimension i
of R1 the greatest lower bound of Iy+1 exceeds that of Iy (as we have assumed that
the equilibrium is not unique), as
V.\ min Ui (< t) < £ rjJOi (<») < min U, ( < f ) (1)
But him |minfc Ui (cy<k) — minfc Ui (cf.t1)} = 0» because the sets Iy are bounded
above. Nowmin^ Ui \cy^) — min* Ui (<%%} = 0 implies min* Ui (c-0 = J2k ^l^i ( cUj •
Thi i l if h ilibi l l i i H i h l i i h i
} ( ( j
This is true only if the equilibrium at level y is unique. Hence in the limit the equi-
libria at level y converge to a unique equilibrium, which is Pareto efficient. By (2)
above expected utility vectors are Pareto improving as y increases. This completes
the proof. •
We have assumed in (A3) that the underlying exchange economy E1 is regular,
so that it has a finite number of equilibria. We now also require the set of markets at
each level to form a regular economy, so that at each level the number of equilibria
is finite. We assume this explicitly:
A4- At every level, the set of equilibria is finite.
Such a property could be formally derived from more basic assumptions, including
smoothness assumptions on demand functions. An outline of how this could be done
follows: we offer only an outline of the derivation of this property, as a complete proof
would involve an excursion into differential topology which is not the purpose of this
paper. In outline the argument is as follows.
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The endowments of all agents in E1 can be represented by a vector W1 in RIJ.
Debreu [11] establishes that the set of endowments W1 for which E1 has a finite set
of equilibria, is a "generic set", having a closure that is of Lebesgue measure one.
Furthermore, he shows that on a neighborhood of an endowment vector W1 in this
generic set, the map 0 : W1 € RIJ —• (RlJ)#l, which sends endowment vectors W1
into # x vectors of equilibrium consumptions, can be represented by #* continuously
differentiate functions 0jt : Wl € RIJ —*• RIJ, k — 1,.., #*, such that the equilibria
are the # x distinct points 6 i (W1) , . . , 0 # i {Wl).
The equilibria of I?1 are the endowments of E2 : call a vector of endowments in E2,
W2 € (RIJ)* . Then for endowments in E1 in a neighborhood of a regular endowment
vector, W2 = 0 a (W1),.., 0#i (W1) depends differentiably on the endowment of E1.
Furthermore, by Debreu's theorem on economies with a finite set of equilibria, for a
generic set of W2 € (RIJ)*X, the number of equilibria in E2 is finite. The consumption
vectors of this finite set of equilibria form the endowments of E3.
Suppose that W2* 6 (RIJ)*1 is such that E2 in fact has an infinite number of
equilibria. Then within any neighborhood of W2* there exists W2 such that the
number of equilibria arising from W2 is instead finite. Such a W2 can be obtained
as the endowment vector in E2 by a small modification of the endowments in El
from Wl to W1' : formally, Wr = 0 ! (Wv) , . . , 0 # i {Wl~) where Wl~ is close to
W1. This follows from the fact that the Walras correspondence is a manifold (Balasko
[2]) and from the strict concavity of preferences.
In general, suppose that at all levels up to level k the set of equilibria is finite, but
that there are infinitely many equilibria at level k. A small change in the endowments
at level k will generate an economy with a finite set of equilibria, and this small change
can be produced by a small change in the endowments of the economy El.
By such arguments,.one can establish that the finiteness of the set of equilibria
at every level, for any finite number of levels, is at least an open property in the
underlying exchange economy El.
4 Insurance against Endogenous Uncertainty
We can now state and prove the main theorem of this paper, which establishes that the
introduction of a finite number of derivative securities at a finite number of different
levels in the economy will suffice to remove all endogenous uncertainty and to provide
a unique Pareto efficient and fully-insured allocation of resources in the underlying
economy El. Note that this allocation is not one of the competitive equilibria of the
underlying economy El.
Theorem 1 Let the underlying exchange economy E1 satisfy (Al) to (A4). Then
there is a finite number N such that an N-level economy defined as in Section 2
will have a unique equilibrium consumption vector that is fully insured and is Pareto
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efficient in E1. The addition of extra levels of derivative security markets up to level
N leads to Pareto improvements.
Proof. If an initial endowment vector Wl € RIJ is Pareto efficient in El, then
there is a unique no-trade equilibrium associated with this, which is just the initial
endowment vector. By Balasko [3] an initial endowment vector that is Pareto efficient
is a generic vector in the sense of Debreu's theorem [11]. By Debreu's theorem, there is
a neighborhood of this initial endowment within which the equilibrium is still unique.
Hence there is a neighborhood, denoted $ , of the set of Pareto efficient allocations in
El such that if the initial endowment is in $ then the equilibrium is unique.
An equilibrium consumption vector for an agent at level y is an element of RJ#y~ ,
where #y~1 is the number of states at level y, i.e. the number of equilibria at level
y — 1. However, as by Lemma 1 equilibria are fully insured against uncertainty about
the equilibria to be selected at previous levels, the equilibrium consumption vector
is fully identified by its first J components. It can be regarded as an element of
RJ and a consumption vector in E1. Hence we shall denote by cyik G RJ agent i's
consumption at equilibrium k in level y.
By Lemma 2, we know that the properties asserted by the theorem hold as N —•
oo. In particular, the vector of agents' expected utility levels across equilibria EU[y]
converges to a point in the UPF as y —• oo. As the vector of agents' expected
utility levels converges to a point in the UPF, the associated consumption vectors
(cfjt)jt=i,..,#» must converge to a Pareto efficient allocation in E1. Hence for sufficiently
large N, the equilibrium consumption vector will be an element of $ and so the
competitive equilibrium at level N will be unique. This proves the theorem. •
We have now established that introducing a finite number of levels of securities,
and their derivatives, will provide full insurance against the endogenous uncertainty
arising from lack of knowledge of the equilibrium price vector. Many levels are needed
because the introduction of each level of securities will in general remove the uncer-
tainty associated with not knowing the equilibrium price of the previous level, but will
introduce further uncertainty arising from lack of knowledge of the price at this new
level. The securities and their derivatives have to be traded as part of a hierarchical
multi-level economy because, as discussed in the introduction and in Chichilnisky
Hahn and Heal [6], goods, price-contingent goods and their derivatives cannot all be
traded in an economy with one single budget constraint. In this case arbitrage would
enforce relations between the various prices that would make the price-contingent
goods and their derivatives redundant. Theorem 1 establishes that markets for price-
contingent goods will lead each agent to a fully-insured consumption vector, i.e., a
vector that is independent of the realization selected in the multi-level economy with
N levels. The consumption vector of any agent corresponding to a realization is the
sum of the agent's consumption vectors at the equilibria chosen at each level in that
realization.
We conjecture that the number N of levels needed to achieve uniqueness and full
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insurance depends on the probability distributions over equilibria at each level. The
intuition for this conjecture is as follows. In the extreme case that the distribution
assigns probability one to a single equilibrium at level one, clearly no further levels
are needed. Consider now a case in which the distribution assigns a probability close
to one to a single equilibrium CE\ at level one. In this case the vector of expected
utilities across equilibria of level one, EU[1], is close to the utility possibility frontier
UPF because it is close to the utility vector associated with the single equilibrium
CE\ at which the probability is concentrated, and this equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
Hence the expected utility of endowments at level 2, which equals EU[l], is also close
to the UPF. The expected utility vector across the equilibria of level two, EU[2],
is Pareto superior to ££/[l], and so is closer to the UPF than is EU[l\. Hence if
EU[\] were close enough to the UPF, i.e., the probability distribution at level one
were sufficiently concentrated at the single equilibrium CE\, the equilibria of level
two and so the endowments of level three would be within the neighborhood # of the
set of Pareto efficient allocations within which equilibria are unique. In this case a
unique and fully insured equilibrium would be attained with three levels.
In the next section, we turn to an institutional interpretation of Theorem 1. We
relate it to securities based on price indices and to trading strategies based on options.
5 Institutional Interpretations
There are two results that help give a concrete institutional interpretation to Lemma
2 and Theorem 1. One is that contracts that are contingent on the value of a price
vector, can also be designed to be contingent on the value of a price index. Contracts
contingent on a price vector can therefore be interpreted as index contracts. The
second is that the pattern of payoffs as a function of goods prices exhibited by our
price-contingent securities, can be replicated by a limit of trading strategies based on
index options. Overall, these two results imply that the securities (price-contingent
commodities) traded in our multi-level economy, can be understood as options on
price indices and their derivatives.
Lemma 3 Consider a set of distinct price vectors pl,p2,...,pk G RJ* Then for an
open dense set of Q € RJ, each price vector gives a different value to the index p'.fi.
Proof. Assume Q ^ 0. Let p1, ...p9 be such that
p'.ft ? p> A V: # j and ij € {1, ..,$} (2)
For p9*1, ...,pk we have
j?+1.n = p?+2.Q. = =pk.Sl (3)
Property (2) is an open property, so that there is a neighborhood NQ of fl within
which it holds. Property (3) is a closed property and implies that (pl — p3') .0 = OVi,j
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in {#+1,..., k}. Now for any x / 0, {ft : x.ft = 0} has measure zero and has no interior
in RJ. Hence in the neighborhood NQ of ft there exists a ft' such that (3) fails and
(2) still holds. The set of such ft' is open. This proves the theorem. •
This result assures us that distinct equilibrium price vectors map into distinct
index numbers using almost any set of weights. Hence we can refer interchangeably
to contracts that pay contingent on the value of a price vector or to contracts that pay
contingent on the value of a price index.
Finally, we relate the payoff patterns of the contracts traded in the multi-level
economy to those that can be realized by trading index options. The contracts traded
in level 2 are goods contingent on the equilibrium price vector selected in El. By
Theorem 2 above, they can be interpreted as goods contingent on the value of a price
index. Now, from the work of Arrow [1], we know that a market for contingent goods
can be replaced by a market for securities that pay contingent on the same event plus
spot markets for the uncontingent goods (see also the discussion in Chichilnisky Hahn
and Heal [6]). Hence in level two we can trade securities that pay if and only if a price
index attains a particular value, i.e. their payoff as a function of the index number is
zero everywhere except at a single point. This payoff structure can be replicated by
the limit of a sequence of option trading strategies. Assume that the critical value of
the price index is V, i.e. we require a non-zero payoff if and only if the index assumes
value V. The basic option trading strategy is as follows:
Buy n index call options with exercise price (V — -M .
Sell 2n index call options with exercise price V.
Buy n index call options with exercise price (V + ^J .
It is routine to verify that as n —• oo, the payoff function from this strategy
converges pointwise to a function that is zero everywhere except at V, where it assumes
value 1. Hence the desired payoff structure can be approximated arbitrarily closely
by the above strategy for n sufficiently large4. It is also worth noting that the payoff
functions that characterize our index-contingent securities, are those associated with
what Rubinstein [18] calls "binary options": these are also discussed in Cox and
Rubinstein [10]. It follows from this that the contracts traded in level 2, goods
contingent on the equilibrium price vector selected in level 1, can be replaced by a
combination of spot markets and markets for options based on the price index in level
1. The same reinterpretation can of course be carried out at other levels.
4This analysis of course ignores transaction costs. If the cost of each option trade are positive,
then they will become infinite in the limit. The relative payoffs at different values of V are not
affected by transaction costs, but their absolute values are affected and may be made negative
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6 Concluding Comments
There is some connection between our results and those on sunspots (Cass and Shell
[4]). Both literatures study uncertainty which does not affect the economy's total
endowments. Cass and Shell call this extrinsic uncertainty: we call it endogenous
uncertainty. There is therefore a common element in the motivation of the studies.
However, there are also big differences in the way the analysis is conducted. Sunspots
by assumption do not directly affect any real variables: any effect that they have is
via agents' beliefs and their impact on agents' behavior. Here, however, the state
selected by definition has an effect on real variables because it determines the equi-
librium chosen. A clear contrast is with Proposition 3 of [4], which states that with
complete markets ("unrestricted market participation") and agreement on probabil-
ities, sunspots do not matter. All of our results occur in the context of complete
markets and agreement on probabilities, precisely the case in which sunspot phenom-
ena are not important. In addition, sunspots can matter in economies with unique
equilibria ([4], appendix), a case about which we have nothing to say. So the two
strands of literature are complementary.
There are several natural directions for further research. One is to study the
sensitivity of our results to the assumption that all agents know and agree on the
probabilities of the endogenous states. It appears that Lemma 1 (on full insurance)
depends strongly on this assumption, and subsequent results in turn depend strongly
on Lemma 1. So the treatment of endogenous uncertainty with diverse beliefs appears
to be an open issue. Another natural development of our present analysis, is in the
direction of a model of asset pricing. Derivative securities play a natural and integral
role in our model: it would be of interest to investigate the relationship between their
prices at equilibrium, the equilibrium prices of goods in the underlying economy E1,
and the probability distributions over equilibria. It would be of particular interest
to have formulae for equilibrium derivative securities prices emerge from a model in
which these securities are not redundant.5
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